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1. Introduction. 
In "Uncertainty, Potential Power, and Nondecisions," it was 
found that the probability of a change-response [P(C)] is 
inversely proportional to a central person's (C's) potential 
power even if S does not know what the probability of C's use of 
his power is and even if S does not know what C's preferences 
(for change) are. 
There are two possible explanations of this effect, both of 
which are discussed in that paper. It is possible that S is 
making inferences from what S knows about C and about C's 
situation (provided by E's instructions about the setting) to 
infer C's preferences and, given inferences about C's preferences 
to infer C's probabilities of use of the power to sanction. It 
is also possible that under uncertainty S's who do not know what 
C prefers or how likely C is to sanction S for noncompliance 
increasingly minimize the probability of a penalty as the cost of 
such a penalty increases, regardless of what S infers about C's 
preferences, etc. We will refer to the first as the inference 
hypothesis and to the second as the minimin hypothesis. 
Evidence from previous theory and research can be found to 
support both of these hypotheses, in Tversky and Kahneman for 
inference, in VonNeumann and Morgenstern for the minimin 
hypothesis. (Note that the minimax hypothesis is actually a 
different idea: With the minimin hypothesis, it is the 
probability of the penalty that is minimized, not the magnitude.) 
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If we want to choose between the two hypotheses or estimate 
their relative importance as explanations for the results of the 
potential power experiment we must find some way to strip the 
experimental setting of the cues that inform S of C's interests 
in things as they are. After a good deal of thought, it did not 
seem likely that the desired result could be obtained by any 
simple changes in the standardized experimental setting (SES) 
used in the nondecision research program. Nor did it seem worth 
the investment to develop a full-scale alternative (requiring a 
year's work at least). A cheaper alternative is to attempt a 
"simulation" in the Bern sense of that word (as opposed to the 
computer sense of it). 
Cronkite has shown how uncertain are the inferences that can 
be made from this method without a full-scale program of research 
to determine how the simulate relates to the experimental 
setting. (See Cronkite, 1979). Nevertheless, the method is 
adopted in the following memorandum with certain safeguards 
motivated by Cronkite's critique. 
2. Method. 
Cronkite analyzes two purposes of simulation: as a cheap 
and convenient substitute for experiment in testing a hypothesis; 
and as a means of justifying an alternative interpretation 
(usually involving an argument of "simplicity" or "parsimony" 
that favors the simulate). Here we actually have a third, 
somewhat different, purpose. We want first to establish that the 
simulation is isomorphic to the SES, then alter the simulation to 
rule out one possible hypothesis about the effects found in the 
exper iment. 
We actually have two previous experiments in the same SES 
that can be used in establishing the isomorphism of experiment to 
simulation. The first is the experiment testing the "law of 
anticipated reactions" (hereafter the LAR experiment) . The 
second is the potential power experiment (hereafter the BKI 
experiment, referring to its three conditions, baseline, 
knowledge, and ignorance). The simulation describes the 
conditions of these two experiments to a respondent (R) who is 
asked to say how he would respond in the experiment as if R were 
an S in the experiment. 
The simulation then describes the conditions to R in a 
different way, stripping the setting of any cues to C's 
preferences, interests, goals or feelings, and again asks R to 
say how he would behave as if R were S. Finally, R is asked to 
respond not as S but as an observer of other individuals in S's 
position. 
3. Simulation of the LAR experiment. 
Eighty-three male students were given a questionnaire in 
which the following situation was described to them: 
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Imagine that you are in a situation in which: 
You are working at a task with five other people. 
One member of the group (not you) is chosen to allocate 
the money earned by the group as he or she sees fit. 
The person who allocates the team earnings was chosen at 
random and is exactly like you in age, sex, and education. 
The person who allocates team earnings is also in a 
position to earn extra money worth about three times as 
much as the rest of the team if they shared earnings 
equally. This seems unfair to you. 
There is a legitimate way to change things so that you 
would have an equal chance to get the extra money. 
Whether or not you choose to change things, the person 
originally chosen to allocate team earnings will continue to 
decide how they are divided. 
In fact, if he or she wishes, s/he may choose to withhold 
team earnings entirely from any team member who tries to 
change things. 
Thus, you are faced with the following choices. Circle 
the letter that best represents your choice in each 
situation, and briefly describe your reasons for making 
the choice. 
R was then asked to answer the following questions "in a way 
that best represents your views. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Work as quickly as you can, but please read the 
background material and each question CAREFULLY." They were told 
not to put their name on the questionnaire to assure their 
anonymity. Response rates are shown in parentheses after each 
response alternative. 
Problem 1. 
You are told that past experience has indicated that the 
person allocating shares of the team earnings generally 
likes the position, prefers to stay in it, and almost 
always withholds shares of team earnings from those who 
attempt to change the set-up. Here are the two possible 
choices you could make: 
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A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $8.00 (your 
share of group pay) (71%) 
OR 
B. Change things for a probability of almost 0 of earning 
$12.00 (which is how much you would earn with both an 
equal share of team earnings plus extra pay) and a 
probability of almost 1 of gaining nothing. (29%). 
Which would you choose? Why? (See below.) 
Problem 2. 
You are told that past experience has indicated that the 
person allocating shares of the team earnings generally 
1ikes the position, prefers to stay in it, and withholds 
shares of team earnings from those who attempt to change the 
set-up about 50% of the time, but that 50% of the time they 
are not withheld. Here are the two possible choices you 
could make. 
A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $8.00 (your 
share of group pay) (45%) 
OR 
B. Change things for a probability of .5 of earning $12.00 
and a probability of .5 of gaining nothing. (55%) 
Which would you choose? Why? (See below.) 
Problem 3. 
You are told that past experience has indicated that the 
person allocating shares of team earnings generally likes 
the position, prefers to stay in it, and almost neveT 
withholds shares of team earnings from those who attempt to 
change the set-up. Here are the two possible choices you 
could make: 
A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $8.00 (your 
share of group pay) (10%) 
OR 
B. Change things for a probability of almost 1 of earning 
$12.00 and a probability of almost 0 of gaining nothing. 
(90%) 
Which would you choose? Why? (See below). 
In explaining why they made the responses they-did, 
virtually all the answers when sanctions are almost certain are 
accounted for by two alternative reasons for behavior. The 71% 
who made no change said they did not because sanctions were 
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certain. The remaining R's almost all said they would change 
because of desire for equity, 27%. But 1% said they liked to 
gamble, and 1% said they had nothing to lose. 
When the likelihood of a sanction is .5, those who do not 
change still say sanctions are a sure thing (46% of all R's), but 
those who change divide among those who desire equity (31%), 
those who like to gamble (11%), and those who see little risk 
(12%). 
When the likelihood of a sanction is almost 0, there is no 
explanation in the why-responses for those who stay. Equity 
motivates 28% of the R's, 70% see little risk, only 1% say that 
sanction is still a sure thing, and 1% say they know C's 
preferences, hence there is still a risk. 
The following table compares the results of the simulation 
with those of the LAR experiment. 
Table 1. Comparison of the LAR experiment with the LAR simulation 
Percentage of Change-Responses 
P (S) LAR Experiment LAR Simulation 
Almost Always 27% 29% 
About Half 42% 55% 
Almost Never 62% 90% 
It is clearly unwarranted to assume that the simulation is 
isomorphic to the experiment. The Method interacts with the 
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manipulations in such a way that, although the basic finding is 
the same in both methods (C-r-esponses are inversely proportional 
to the probability of sanctions), the simulation constrains 
change less than the experiment and the differences between 
methods increase as P(S) decreases. 
4. Simulation of the BKI experiment. 
R's were asked: 
Problem 4. 
You are told that past experience has indicated that the 
person allocating shares of the team earnings generally 
1ikes the position, and prefers to stay in it. However, 
you have no basis at all for forming a view of whether or 
not that person will use the power to withhold team earnings 
against anyone who attempts to change the set-up. Here are 
the two possible choices you could make: 
A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $8.00 (your 
share of group pay) (49%) 
OR 
B. Change things for an unknown probability of earning 
$12.00 and an unknown probability of gaining nothing. 
(51%) 
Which would you choose? Why? (See below.) 
Problem 5. You have no way of knowing whether the person allocating 
shares of the team earnings likes that position o£ would 
want to stay in it, and, therefore, no way of knowing 
whether that person will use the power to withhold team 
earnings against anyone who attempts to change the set-up. 
Here are the two possible choices you could make: 
A. Leave the set-up as is for sure earnings of $8.00 (your 
share of group pay) (42%) 
B. Change things for an unknown probability of earning 
$12.00 and an unknown probability of gaining nothing. 
(58%) 
Which would you choose? Why? (See below.) 
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Explaining their responses, 44% of those who knew C's 
preferences and 34% of those who did not said they stayed because 
sanctions were certain. Another 2% of those who knew C's 
preferences said that they knew his preferences and therefore 
there was some risk of sanction. In the same way, 6% of those 
who did not know C's preferences said that they were uncertain, 
but there was some risk and therefore they did not make a 
change-response. Change, in both cases, was explained by cesire 
for equity (38% in the knowledge condition and 35% in the 
ignorance condition), pleasure of a gamble (9% and 11%), small 
chance of risk (6% and 13%) , or the fact that there was little to 
either gain or lose (1% in each condition). 
Comparing the results of the simulation to the results of 
the BKI experiment, 
Table 2. Comparison of the BKI experiment to the BKI simulation. 
Percentage of Change-Responses 
Condition BKI Experiment BKI Simulation 
Knowledge of Preferences 70% 51% 
Ignorance of Preferences 52% 58% 
Baseline Condition 95% 
At first sight there looks to be a large difference between 
the two (a 19% difference between experiment and simulation in 
the knowledge condition). If this is a real difference it is a 
puzzling one, because to this point one would suppose that what 
differentiates the simulation from the experiment is the greater 
effect of desire for autonomy on the simulation (a difference 
which makes sense). However, it is worth calling attention to 
the fact that the difference between the knowledge and ignorance 
condition in the BKI experiment (70-52 = 18%) is not a 
significant difference. (More exactly, the differences between 
the two survivor curves, of which this statistic is one point, 
are not significant.) Hence, the result of the BKI experiment is 
that both knowledge and ignorance differ from the baseline but 
the two do not differ from each other. The result of the 
simulation is also that knowledge and ignorance do not differ 
from each other. 
5. Simulation of the Ignorance Condition when C's objective 
interests are unknown. 
Few R's in the BKI simulation explained their behavior by 
appeal to a minimum principle. Almost all appealed instead to 
inferences made about C's preferences. Even without knowing C's 
preferences (i.e. without any information from the experimenter 
(E) about them), R's felt able to infer them from what they knew 
about the structure of the situation, hence C's objective 
interests. Furthermore, if they knew C's preferences they also 
felt able to infer C's probable sanction behavior (which 
presumably increases with the intensity of C's preferences). 
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Would this mean that if S's in the BKI experiment were not 
able to make such inferences their change-rate would increase? 
An attempt was made to simulate a situation in which R had no 
available cues to infer C's interests or preferences. Two kinds 
of simulations were attempted, one in which R was to think of 
himself as in S's role and one in which (as in Bern's simulations) 
R was to think of himself as an observer of others in S's role 
and predict how the others would behave. 
The question asked of R's was: 
You are one of five people undergoing a group interview for 
graduate school. This particular school has always had a top 
reputation in your field, and after talking with faculty and 
students you are convinced that this is the place for you. 
You decide that you would not want to settle for anyplace 
else, and will do everything possible to be accepted. 
The interview seems to be going well for everyone, but you 
have been told that only one of you can expect to be accepted. 
The questions asked by the interviewer up to this point have 
been very general and rather easily answered. Now, however, 
the interviewer askes a very specific question about how you 
would deal with an issue of great controversy in your field. 
You are familiar with both sides of the issue, of course, but 
lean toward a particular point of view. You know that this 
question is being asked as some sort of test or selection 
mechanism. Naturally, you want to appear to your best 
advantage in the group, so you figure that you should answer 
the question first. This, however, is a gamble, as you have 
NO IDEA how the interviewer feels about this particular topic, 
and you feel that your view, although less traditional, is 
better and is in fact the method of the future for handling 
the situation. 
What would you do? Circle the letter that best represents 
your choice, and briefly describe your reasons for making 
that choice. Assume that members of your group are the same 
sex and generally the same age as you, and that the 
interviewer is the same sex as you. 
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A. I would propose the traditional point of view. (0) 
B. I would propose my point of view. (70%) 
C. I would not be the first to speak. (30%) 
WHY? (See below) . 
What do you think others would do in this situation? 
A. Traditional view. (1%) 
B. Own view. (46%) 
C. Would not speak first. (53%) 
WHY? (See below) . 
In explaining their behavior, the 70% who thought they would 
openly express their own point of view appealed to either a desire 
to be honest or to be autonomous. The 30% who thought they would 
not speak first all said that this was the cautious thing to do. 
In explaining the behavior of others the answers were very much the 
same: Forty-three per cent thought others would express their own 
views because of needs for honesty or autonomy; 6% explained either 
expressing a traditional view, waiting, or expressing one's own 
view, by the fact that the interviewer would prefer it; and 51% 
explained not speaking first by the need for caution until one knew 
what the interviewer thought, how he reacted to other people's 
views, etc. 
Thus, there is a marked autonomy effect in this simulation 
reflected in marked differences between predicting one's own 
behavior and the behavior of others. But in explaining the 
behavior of others there is a strong effect of a minimax-like 
principle, minimizing the probability that the worst that could 
happen does. 
6. Summary and Conclusions. 
The first conclusion to draw from these results is that it is 
unwarranted to assume that the simulation replicates the 
experiment. There are in principle three kinds of differences 
between simulation and experiment, probably all of which operate 
here: First, the manipulations differ and therefore probably 
differ in the strength of effect on the unobservable independent 
variables (C's potential power, intensity of C's preferences, 
probability of a sanction, importance of the sanction to S or R). 
Second, the measurement of a change-response differs (behavior vs 
verbal report) ana therefore probably the estimates of the 
magnitude of effect on the unobservable dependent variable 
(protest). Third, there are differences in the specification of 
the two models that underlie the experiment vs the simulation. For 
example, the demand characteristics of the experiment do not occur 
in the simulation (i.e. the cues to what the E wants probably 
differ), the motivations of S probably differ from those of R, the 
constraints that inhibit the expression of needs for autonomy (or 
the demand characteristics that lead S vs R to believe that 
autonomy is expected by E) differ between the experiment and 
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simulation. 
But the failure of isomorphism between the two should not 
disguise how similar the results of the two are. If one simply 
compared the two ordinally, their effect would be essentially the 
same: If S (or R) knows C's preferences and the probability of a 
sanction, a change-response is inversely proportional to the 
probability of a sanction. If S does not know how likely a 
sanction is or not even what C prefers, he is much less likely to 
make a change-response if C could sanction him, but it makes little 
difference whether he knows C's preferences or not. The first part 
of this latter result is not replicated in the design of the 
simulation; the second part is found in the simulation as well as 
in the experiment. 
The autonomy effect, which is perhaps one of the factors that 
differentiates the simulation from the experiment, is particularly 
important in differentiating two kinds of simulation: When R is in 
the role of S he prominently predicts autonomy. When R is in the 
role of observer of S, he predicts a change-response (or its 
equivalent) only about half the time (roughly the same as in the 
simulation of the SES and roughly the same as in the BKI 
experiment). Furthermore, explaining why this response is likely, 
R appeals to the need to minimize the prospects of the worse that 
could happen actually happening. 
This does not necessarily imply that the minimin hypothesis 
1 
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explained the behavior of the ignorance condition in the BKI 
experiment either in part or as a whole. That is, the logic that 
led Bern to reject Festinger's dissonance hypothesis because a 
simulation led R's to predict the same result when they were not 
themselves in a dissonant state (and to adopt in its place the 
sel f-perception hypothesis) cannot be used here to justify the 
conclusion that the minimin hypothesis was the real explanation of 
the BKI results. The logic is perhaps right: If one removes the 
basis for inferring C's preferences one still gets about the same 
rate of C-responses, which R explains as a result of a minimin 
principle. But if R does have the cues provided by the SES what R 
does is somewhat similar to the experiment and he explains this by 
appeal to preferences and sanctions inferred from the setting. We 
are in other words about where we were before we did the 
simulation: Either or both of the two hypotheses, inference or 
minimining, explains the results of the BKI experiment. 
